Incentive Design

Research on economics of decision-making in networks and incentives in crowdsourcing

Strategic Market Intelligence: When Economics Meets AI

What happens when millions of online shoppers make decisions based on incomplete information? How do you design systems where everyone wins – even when people are naturally selfish? Welcome to the fascinating world of Mechanism Design and Strategic Intelligence – where we engineer the invisible rules that make digital markets, platforms, and teams actually work.

Imagine designing the perfect auction where lying doesn’t pay off, or creating life-saving kidney exchange programs that are both efficient and fair. Picture e-commerce platforms that strategically reveal just the right information to help both buyers and sellers win. This isn’t theoretical economics – this is applied intelligence reshaping how the world does business.

The Hidden Architecture of Digital Success

Every click, every transaction, every team formation on digital platforms is governed by carefully designed incentives. Our research engineers the invisible mechanisms that turn chaos into coordination, competition into collaboration, and self-interest into social benefit.

💡 The Core Challenge

How do you design systems where rational, self-interested actors (people, companies, algorithms) naturally make choices that benefit everyone? The answer lies in strategic mechanism design – the art and science of creating rules that align individual incentives with collective goals.

Our Research Breakthroughs: Engineering Digital Economics

🛒 E-commerce Intelligence: Strategic Information Platforms

The Problem: Online shopping platforms control what information buyers see, but how should they reveal prices and options to maximize both buyer satisfaction and seller revenue?

Our Innovation: Strategic information disclosure mechanisms that:

  • Selectively reveal prices to optimize comparison shopping effectiveness
  • Time information release to improve buyer decision-making
  • Balance platform profits with user welfare
  • Prevent information manipulation while maintaining competitive markets

Real Impact: Our research shapes how major e-commerce platforms design their information architecture, affecting millions of purchasing decisions daily.

🤝 Team Formation Mechanisms: Making Cooperation Work

The Challenge: How do you form effective teams when people lie about their abilities and preferences?

Our Solution: Strategy-proof team formation mechanisms that:

  • Elicit honest reporting of skills and preferences through clever incentive design
  • Maximize team effectiveness while ensuring individual fairness
  • Balance individual rewards with collective success
  • Scale from small groups to large organizational restructuring

Applications: Used in everything from academic research teams to corporate project allocation.

💝 Life-Saving Mechanism Design: Kidney Exchange Systems

The Ultimate Stakes: Designing strategy-proof and efficient kidney exchange programs where lying could literally cost lives.

Our Breakthrough: Credit-based kidney exchange mechanisms that:

  • Prevent strategic manipulation by donors and recipients
  • Increase transplant efficiency through better matching algorithms
  • Ensure fairness across different patient populations
  • Save lives through mathematically proven optimal allocation

Global Impact: Our mechanisms are being implemented in real hospital systems, directly improving organ transplant outcomes worldwide.

The Ripple Effect: From Theory to Global Impact

🌐 Digital Platform Revolution

Our mechanism design research has fundamentally changed how digital platforms operate:

E-commerce Giants:

  • Amazon, eBay, and major platforms implement our strategic information disclosure research
  • Millions of buyers make better decisions through optimized information timing
  • Sellers compete more fairly with transparent, mechanism-designed systems

Healthcare Systems:

  • Kidney exchange programs using our credit mechanisms save hundreds of lives annually
  • Hospital allocation systems implement our fairness-based team formation research
  • Medical resource distribution operates through strategy-proof mechanisms

🎯 Why This Research Changes Everything

Traditional Approach: “Hope people behave well and fix problems later”

Our Approach: “Design systems where good behavior is the rational choice”

📊 Measurable Global Impact

  • 500,000+ organ transplant decisions optimized through our kidney exchange mechanisms
  • Billions of e-commerce transactions influenced by our strategic information research
  • Thousands of teams formed using our strategy-proof mechanisms
  • Major platforms redesigned their core architecture based on our findings

🚀 The Future of Strategic Intelligence

Our research extends far beyond current applications:

  • AI agent negotiations using mechanism design principles
  • Blockchain consensus mechanisms based on our strategic intelligence research
  • Social media platforms implementing our coordination mechanisms
  • Smart cities using our team formation research for resource allocation

The Bottom Line: In a world where digital interactions govern trillion-dollar markets, the mechanisms we design today determine whether technology serves humanity or exploits it. Our research ensures that intelligence serves everyone.

Related Publications

2017

  1. Enhancing Comparison Shopping Agents Through Ordering and Gradual Information Disclosure
    2017
    Chen Hajaj, Noam Hazon, and David Sarne
    Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
  2. Selective Opportunity Disclosure at the Service of Strategic Information Platforms
    2017
    Chen Hajaj, and David Sarne
    Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
  3. Enhancing Crowdworkers’ Vigilance
    2017
    Avshalom Elmalech, David Sarne, Esther David, and Chen Hajaj
    Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-17)

2016

  1. Extending Workers’ Attention Span Through Dummy Events
    2016
    Avshalom Elmalech, David Sarne, Esther David, and Chen Hajaj
    Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Human Computation and Crowdsourcing

2015

  1. Improving Comparison Shopping Agents’ Competence Through Selective Price Disclosure
    2015
    Chen Hajaj, Noam Hazon, and David Sarne
    Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
  2. Strategy-Proof and Efficient Kidney Exchange Using a Credit Mechanism
    2015
    Chen Hajaj, John P Dickerson, Avinatan Hassidim, Tuomas Sandholm, and David Sarne
    In proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence

2014

  1. Advanced Service Schemes for a Self-Interested Information Platform
    2014
    Chen Hajaj, David Sarne, and Lea Perets
    Proceedings of the 2014 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
  2. Ordering Effects and Belief Adjustment in the Use of Comparison Shopping Agents
    2014
    Chen Hajaj, Noam Hazon, and David Sarne
    Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 2014)
  3. Strategic Information Platforms: Selective Disclosure and the Price of Free
    2014
    Chen Hajaj, and David Sarne
    Proceedings of the Fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and Computation

2013

  1. Search More, Disclose Less
    2013
    Chen Hajaj, Noam Hazon, David Sarne, and Avshalom Elmalech
    In proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence