Rational agents pursue their own interests — but well-designed rules can make selfish behavior lead to good collective outcomes. We apply mechanism design and game theory to build systems where honesty and cooperation are the optimal strategy, from e-commerce to organ donation.
Research Areas
- Strategic Information Disclosure in E-Commerce — Disclosure mechanisms that improve buyer decisions and platform welfare simultaneously on platforms like Amazon, without sacrificing honesty or profit.
- Strategy-Proof Team Formation — Mechanisms where truth-telling about skills is the dominant strategy, guaranteeing effective team composition even when participants have incentives to misreport.
- Kidney Exchange Optimization — Credit-based incentive systems for paired donation programs that prevent strategic withholding of compatible pairs, increasing overall transplant rates while preserving fairness.
Technical Approach
Our work combines classical mechanism design theory (VCG, strategyproofness, incentive compatibility) with computational methods — simulations, algorithmic game theory, and empirical behavioral analysis. Each mechanism comes with formal proofs and is validated against real-world platform data.
Impact
The information disclosure mechanisms have been implemented in real e-commerce settings. Kidney exchange work contributes to national transplant policy discussions. Team formation mechanisms are deployed in organizational settings involving thousands of participants.
Key publications & resources
- Publications — filter by the Multi-Agent topic to see this project's papers.
- Code & software — lab repositories, datasets, and tools.
Collaborate with us
We welcome academic and industry collaborations, and motivated graduate students, on this research line. Get in touch →